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T

his chapter offers a framework for military commanders and policy
makers to begin constructing rules of engagement (ROE) for computer
network attack (CNA) during armed conflict, military operations other than
war, and other overt and covert national security activities. Focused on the operational commander rather than the academic, it introduces the legal and policy
considerations surrounding the drafting of ROE for CNA, and discusses the
unique legal issues that arise from CNA "vithin the law of armed conflict. Such
considerations are important for military commanders, their operators, planners,
and lawyers in designing and employing CNA because they serve to facilitate
and provide guidance that operationalizes the concept of computer network
attack-removing it from the realm of speculation and placing it as a tool in the
hands of military commanders. Moreover, since legal and ROE decisions impact the development of tactics and doctrine, and the acquisition and force
structure processes, the discussion is relevant to force providers and trainers, as
well as fleet commanders.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Emerging Technologies and War
Over the last decade, information technologies, including computer and
communications systems, have brought about a sea change in the global economy. Technology has grown fromjust 6% of the US economy at the beginning
of the 1990s, to over 20% today.1 What was once a narrow "technology" sector
within the whole economy has emerged as the "New Economy," comprised of
that third or fourth of the economy that serves as the source of rapid innovation
and engine of economic growth. 2 Entire subsectors of the New Economy have
emerged, and whole new industries have grown virtually overnight: photonics,
micro-electrical mechanical (MEMs) devices, wireless systems and specialty
communications semiconductors, and, of course, the Internet, which has become omnipresent throughout the economy. The New Economy has transformed industry data management and storage, manufacturing, accounting, and
inventory management. Many of the same technologies have even more dramatically recast military communications, command and control, targeting, logistics and weapons. 3 These technological changes are transforming thinking
about military force structure and doctrine, and have opened up computer network attack as a viable instrument of military power.
Military technology displayed by coalition forces during the Gulf War in
1991, particularly those technologies that were used by the United States military, ignited broad interest among strategists and pollcymakers world\vide in
how to best develop or channel the emerging "revolution in military affairs"
(RMA).4 RMA, which encompasses technologies that "gather, process and
fuse information on a large geographical area in real time, all the time,"5 has
driven the creation of new military capabilities and doctrine based on advanced concepts and emerging technologies. It grew from Cold War planning in the West that sought to apply technology as a force multiplier to
counter numerically superior Soviet forces in Europe. 6 Mter the Cold War,
RMA began to be seen as a way to ensure Western superiority, or at least preserve military advantage, in a broad variety of post-Cold War conflicts that
might be encountered within the context of a resource-constrained defense
budget environment. Computer network attack is one of the latest and most
advanced manifestations of RMA. With the growth of computer networks
and integrated systems, computers have assumed a central role in enabling
both offensive and defensive military operations. Despite \videspread recognition that the technologies that enable computer network attack are already a
reality, the specific legal and policy considerations that will control their employment have received scant attention. This is not surprising, since the
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development of concrete legal analysis tends to lag the advancement in technology, particularly in the application of international law to new methods of
warfare? It is equally important to recall that history is replete with examples
in which superior military technology was squandered, and advantage was
surrendered, because the army employing the new weapon had an inattentive
or feckless approach to developing corresponding doctrine and tactics for its
employment. 8 In the modern era, the. development of appropriate ROE for
CNA, along with operational doctrine, tactics, and force structure, will determine whether CNA is an effective weapon.
In the mid-1990s, the initial US focus on computers and military conflict
resided almost exclusively in defending perceived weaknesses and vulnerabilities in critical national information infrastructure--especially electronic banking, communications, and industrial energy grids. This focus, which emerged
within the Department ofDefense (DoD) as "Information Warfare--Defense"
(IWD) was replicated by other governmental agencies, who also became concerned after 1995 about the vulnerability of their networks, coinciding with
the widespread use of the Internet. 9 All of these efforts migrated under the umbrella term, "Computer Network Defense" (CND), which has served to concentrate interagency resources and attention toward protecting and defending
critical computer and information networks from sabotage by individual hackers, terrorist groups, and unfriendly governments. 1O Planning for CND was accelerated with the advent of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in
May 1998, which ordered federal agencies, in concert with the private sector
and state and local authorities, to create defenses against attacks on critical infrastructures from network assaults from all State and non-State actors that potentially threaten American "national and economic security."l1 The DoD
responded by standing up the Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense
OTF-CND), which was renamed Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations OTF-CNO).12 The JTF is assigned to Commander-in-Chief, United
States Space Command, but has representatives from each military service and
many government agencies. 13 The CND movement has made great progress
in identifYing information infrastructure vulnerabilities, and organizing and
resourcing defensive interagency plans to address them. Initial panic at perceived gaping holes in critical information infrastructure has recendy given
way to a more measured and sober, and more confident, vulnerability assessment. Now that the concern over CND has stabilized, US planners, particularly in the military, have begun to more seriously consider the potential
advantages to be gained in military operations by offensive attack against an adversary's information infrastructure.
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Computer Network AHack
Computer network attack has emerged as one of the more promising tools
available to a military commander for mission accomplishment and self-defense.
It encompasses activities designed to " ... disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
networks themselves. "14 While the legality ofinformation warfare generally, or
CNA in particular, is very fact-dependent and open to considerable debate, it
has received at least some attention among international law scholars. Some
scholars maintain that a CNA constitutes a use of force, whereas other scholars
maintain that CNA is much more akin to adverse nonforceable influence. 1S This
debate is healthy and serves to shape the international law in the area.
Despite the importance of CNA, military and civilian commanders have
been unable to adequately explain it, or to achieve a consensus in designing
CNA ROE. Moreover, military staffjudge advocates, civilian lawyers ,vithin
the national security and intelligence establishment, and academics are grappling
with how to best articulate the legal and policy underpinnings for computer network attack decisions.
While theories and approaches that emerge from academia are useful to national decision-makers contending with these issues, they may be of limited
value to operational commanders, including those at the Navy fleet and battle
group levels. For the operational commanders, the legal and policy research surrounding CNA often raises more questions than it answers. This results in leaving those commanders who might integrate CNA into real-world operations
confused and frustrated. Rather than offering a theoretical legal model for CNA,
this chapter accepts the premise that CNA is quickly becoming a reality. There is
a broad range of capabilities to attack computer networks that are in various
stages of development, testing, and training, both in the United States and
abroad. There is evidence that they are already being employed in actual operations by a growing number ofnations. Furthermore, as these capabilities become
better understood and easier to use, it is likely that the approval authority to employ them will gravitate downward in the chain of command to task force commanders. Eventually, proven methods of CNA could be authorized to
individual units and platforms. This chapter presents a question of first impression by examining the development of operational CNA ROE for military operations, and it offers a practical approach to drafting CNA ROE. This pressing
issue of exactly how a commander begins to approach the legal aspects of developing and applying CNA in the real world is on the cusp of wide discussions.
There is a tremendous legal and policy gap-between rapidly advancing CNA
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technical capabilities emerging from the laboratories-and the legal architecture
to support them. The advancement of ROE for computer network attack,
which has not kept pace with these developments, should begin to fill this gap.
Detennining the ROE process, considerations for creating the parameters of
CNA engagement, and some guidelines for inclusion in operational orders are
especially important for operational commanders executing real world missions.
The commander should be able to understand which computer network and related military instruments may be used, under what conditions they may be employed, and to which missions they may be applied. This prevents a commander
from either employing means or methods that lie beyond the scope of his or her
authority, and ensures that the he or she does not unnecessarily limit the application of CNA because of confusion over the rules governing its use. There is a
need to discipline and govern the process of development of ROE for CNA.
The National Command Authorities (NCA) have a central stake in overseeing
the process to ensure that the emerging CNA rules of engagement comply with
intemationallaw and domestic legislation, as well as remain in concert with national military policy and national diplomatic and political goals.
For this chapter, we assume that some level of CNA is lawful within the
context of international law, but the more practical question-indeed for
commanders, the greater question-is how best to develop rules of engagement for an actual operation. The objective is to begin to fill in the vacuum
pertaining to the control, application, and employment of CNA at the
warfighting level. 16 Does the existing process for developing ROE adequately
accommodate CNA? What can guide commanders, their warfighters, and operational judge advocates in developing rules for computer network attack? Is
this an area best left to policymakers inside the beltway or is there a role for
crafting rules for CNA at the operational level-forward deployed, at sea, or in
the field? This chapter considers the historical basis for ROE, identifies the factors that fold into ROE development for computer network attack, explores
the considerations that might limit or empower a commander, and suggests an
architecture for designing computer network attack ROE that may be employed throughout the conflict spectrum. By providing a "navigational chart"
to many of these issues, the goal is to begin to demystify the process for commanders and decisionmakers alike.

Historical ROE Development17
Modem ROE have their roots in the naval and maritime tradition. With
the advent of oar and sail, effective central control of a military asset by the
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sending government was lost once a ship got underway from port. It was incumbent upon the commanding officer to conduct the mission pursuant to the
general guidance of the government. Virtually alone until the ship reached the
ne:h.'t friendly port, or until the ship encountered another friendly vessel that
could deliver news or orders, the commanding officer operated within broad
parameters or rules issued by the leadership. The Continental Navy's first exposure to rules governing operations occurred on January 5, 1776, when
Commodore Esek Hopkins received written orders to engage British raiders
that included a broad discretionary clause of authority:
Notwithstanding these particular Orders, which 'tis hoped you will be able to
execute, ifbad Winds or Stonny Weather, or any other unforeseen accident or
disaster disable you so to do You are then to follow such Courses as your best
Judgment shall Suggest to you as most useful to the American Cause and to
distress the Enemy by all means in your power. 1S
Although modem technology has tremendously improved communication
to underway vessels, naval vessels now routinely travel far from port, and transit
much faster-sometimes even underwater-without access to detailed and real
time guidance from a fleet commander or government leader. Prior to World
War II, there was little need for a policy on use of force aside from occasional
ships on diplomatic missions. 19 Following World War II regulations governing
the use of force, now known as rules of engagement, were promulgated in the
1948 United States Navy Regulations with Article 0614, "Use of Force Against
a Friendly State."20 In 1962 the first in a series of ROE were issued that applied
Navy-wide. Written to address the unique challenges and special concerns arising from surface, undersea, and aviation operations throughout the maritime
environment, these ROE were subsequently updated in 1970 and 1981.21 Even
in the updated version, however, they still only applied to US naval forces.
In 1986, the United States issued generalized JCS Peacetime ROE that, for
the first time, included guidance for air and land forces. 22 Two years later, following the experiences of the USS STARK (FFG-31) and USS VINCENNES
(CG-49) in May 1987 and July 1988 respectively, the Peacetime ROE were
again updated and revised. In 1994, a major revision was accomplished, and the
ROE that applied to all US forces were promulgated by the Chairman of the
Joint ChiefS of Staff as the Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces
(SROE)23 Aside from the obvious title change that removed the "peacetime"
reference, the 1994 document not only streamlined the ROE drafting and approval process, but also contained significant revisions, including a more
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uniform approach. Separate ROE issued by the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs)24 augment the SROE, and are referenced as "theater-specific" ROE.25 This marked a break from past practice, in which each
CINC had a theater-wide top-to-bottom set of rules. Also, the 1994 SROE
clarified a commander's inherent right and obligation ofself-defense, and articulated a bright-line distinction between self-defense and the use of force for
mission accomplishment. For self-defense, the SROE are firmly grounded in responding to a hostile act or responding to a demonstration of hostile intent. One
of the more significant changes was the declassification of the basic self-defense
SROE provisions. This enhanced training and application throughout US
forces and enabled better coordination between allies and coalition partners.
The most recent iteration of the SROE was released on January 15, 2000. 26
This latest version further refines and clarifies the concepts contained in earlier
editions. It is comprised mainly of thirteen enclosures, including a separate enclosure for Information Operations. Unlike the 2000 revision, the 1994 edition
contained little substantive mention of CNA, sticking mostly to definitional
terms and basic concept statements. Under the SROE, use ofCNA may be authorized to a commander under the umbrella of the mission ROE provisions and
the international law ofarmed conflict (LOAC), subject to any additional supplemental authorizations or restrictions received from higher authority.27
Even though commanders of forces tasked to accomplish an operation or
mission might be authorized CNA as a means of warfare, that does not mean
they will decide to use it. Historically, personnel in the fleet or field did not question the ROE they were provided. Often, ROE were not well-understood
within theater, or at the tactical level. Moreover, there was a sense that the ROE
dictated from above could not be changed and were to be applied without question. 28 This was demonstrated during the 1981 Gulf of Sidra freedom of navigation operation off the coast ofLibya. Prior to the operation, orders issued to the
Navy F-14s restrained those forces from responding to indications of hostile intent even though the ROE in effect at the time authorized self-defense in response to hostile intent. 29 Another instance occurred during the bombing of the
Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters building in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, when a local commander's interpretation ofthe ROE led to orders
for "sentries to keep their magazines in their ammunition pouches as a precaution against an accidental or over-eager discharge of a weapon that might kill or
wound one of the thousands of Lebanese civilians who visited the airport
daily."30
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Innovation, Military Doctrine, and ROE
Limitations on the use of CNA may also fall victim to unnecessary restraint
due to several factors. First, the complex and typically highly classified nature of
CNA tools may not inspire confidence in commanders. They may be hesitant to
rely upon bare promises that certain CNA tools can accomplish a mission, such
as taking down an air defense site, when proven alternatives, such as air strikes or
cruise missiles, are available. Commanders likely will have had training and experience with kinetic methods, but may not understand or appreciate CNA.
During the 2000 Global War Game at the Naval War College, this dynamic was
repeated by commanders who tended to move away from more speculative instruments toward those which were more familiar. 'This tendency toward traditional and proven methods of warfare has been demonstrated in war games of
other services as well. Nevertheless, the war games also showed that US commanders were becoming more willing to adopt innovative methods to accomplish the mission, even when the methods lack historical record.
The military services are beginning to realize that to gain acceptance as a viable weapon system, the secretive nature of the tools must be reduced to a more
accessible classified level so that commanders and their staffi and subordinate
commands can familiarize themselves with the systems. Consider the development of the machine gun more than one hundred years ago. An American,
Richard J. Gatling, patented and demonstrated a reliable, multi-barreled repeating gun in 1862, but the Belgian-invented and French-developed
mitrailleuse was the first combat-tested machine gun. 31 On the eve of the
Franco-Prussian war, the 11 mm mitrailleuse, recognized by the French army as
a technical breakthrough in firepower, was kept in such tight secrecy in peacetime that very few French officers could discuss or develop doctrine or tactics for
its use on the battlefield. 32 The weapon, which came as a complete surprise to
the Germans, had the potential to swing victory to the French. Instead, advantage was lost because the French were caught up in marveling at the technical aspects of development without devising correspondingly effective doctrine and
tactics for the weapon. 33 Similarly, although the Germans, British, and French
were developing and fielding battle tanks during 1915-1916, they were ineffectively and wastefully employed on the battlefield. It was not until a coherent
doctrine for their employment was developed-most notably by the innovative
British strategist Major J.F.C. Fuller-that the tank was accepted as a viable
weapon rather than a curiosity. On November 20, 1917, a spearhead of 476
British tanks penetrated German lines during the Battle of Cambrai, demonstrating that the armored vehicles could achiev~ rapid and complete command
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of dug-in defenses. 34 Inertia prevents change, and we cannot assume that military commanders in the present day are immune from this phenomenon. Just as
in the examples cited above, bringing ROE for computer network attack from
the general and theoretical to the specific and concrete will help commanders
migrate to computer warfare.
The method by which CNA will accomplish its end result likewise needs to
be eA-plained to commanders, and commanders need to be able to engage in professional debate on the subject. The ROE relate to the underpinning international and domestic authority for using CNA, the scope of the commander's
authority within the context of the national and theater commander's mission,
and the conditions, ifany, in which CNA is considered a lawful attack. One especially important consideration is the potential for collateral effects of CNA in
view of the law of armed conflict. How might CNA affect third countries or
neutral forces beyond the scope ofthe conflict? What might be the effect on civil
societies, civilian populations, businesses, and related public and private infrastructure? What impact might CNA have on protected persons or locations,
such as sick and wounded personnel near the battle area or sites representing religious or cultural heritage? What about the effect on prisoners of war (POWs)
and other protected classes ofpersonnel, such as medical or religious personnel?
Any anticipated or probable primary or secondary civilian injury or damage
must be reviewed to determine whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the
military advantage to be gained. Commanders are coming to view these issues
personally and \vith growing interest since they bear the ultimate responsibility
for the consequences of an attack. The trend toward creating universal multilateral "war crimes" jurisdiction only serves to exacerbate many commanders' uneasiness toward command and personal liability.
The first step is for a commander to be able to understand the foreseeable
consequences of a CNA attack, including damage or disruption to non-military
systems. A review of the potential consequences within the ROE and LOAC
framework is essential to forming a decision on the use of CNA. In particular,
commanders must estimate the expected military benefit of CNA, and weigh
that calculation against the collateral costs of attack. Ideally, the commander
should be supported by an ROE cell that can present a menu of options. The
cell should include representatives from the operations, intelligence and
plans directorate, as well as a judge advocate. The cell should analyze ROE,
targeting and politico-military issues associated with CNA, and deliver recommendations to the commander.
Commanders are rightly hesitant to employ unproven systems as one critical
component of a coordinated attack because if the CNA component fails, then
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the entire effort is imperiled. Inherent risk is already attendant to real world missions without the injection of an unproven, and possibly speculative system.
Doubt as to legality and ROE would only serve to magnify these concerns.
Compounding this problem may be the short life span of the attack due to rapid
advance in technology and creative enemy adaptation. Even more so than conventional weapons systems, once the impact ofa particular CNA has been e=-''Perienced, adversaries can be expected to devise a tailored defense, thereby
limiting future effectiveness. 35 Moreover, the comparatively low cost and global
availability of computer systems and trained programmers enables terrorist
groups or developing nations to enter the realm of information and computer
warfare. All of these factors serve to keep CNA tools underutilized, thereby
foregoing potential military benefit. Doing so deprives a commander of the opportunity to observe its effectiveness in training or on lesser targets prior to applying it to a major target. A successful laboratory demonstration is not likely to
do much to dissuade this opinion. As legal analysis continues to lag technological
breakthrough, we can expect that without great attention, the development of
mission-specific ROE for ever newer computer network attack systems will be a
challenge.
Understanding this background, proponents of the new technology are beginning to realize that not only must they be able to adequately e=-''Plain and demonstrate CNA, but they must also ensure that the commander understands how it
functions. Computer network warfare and information operations are upsetting
the existing Westphalian paradigm of warfare upon which traditional ROE and
law of war are based. The very nature of CNA is rapidly changing. For instance,
some suggest that the architecture of CNA is migrating from the traditional model
of "waves" of attack to a model based on a simultaneous "swarming" or overtaking of an opponent's system. "Swarming occurs when the dispersed nodes of a
network of small ... forces converge on a target from multiple directions. The
overall aim is sustainable pulsing of a force or fire."36 Once in motion, swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, dissever and redisperse, and then immediately recombine for a new pulse. In other words,
information-age attacks may come in swarms rather than the more traditional
waves. 37 Such a paradigm shift could completely transform the way many elements of ROE are applied in computer network attack. The concepts of "hostile
act" and "hostile intent," for example, best fit a linear "wave" model, in which
State action is directed toward another State in waves along a timeline-often becoming more permissive or aggressive as time lapses. Crisis war games bear this
out; often, military exercises begin with a "Road to War" prelude of rising political tensions that gradually escalate into military confrontation. Then, conflict
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slowly accelerates from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The multilateral
US-Thailand-Singaporean series of unclassified COBRA GOLD 00 and 01 exercises were built from this model. Crafting suitable ROE for those scenarios exposed the lack of flexibility inherent in a linear focus.
Swanning attacks would pose, simultaneously, a confusing mixture of actions by a State or non-State actor against a State, with some actions perhaps
tantamount to a "hostile act" or demonstration of "hostile intent." At the same
time, other actions would fall below that threshold, confounding the developmentofROE.
The blurring ofoffense and defense reflects another feature of net-war: it tends to
defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between
state and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and
military, police and military, and legal and illegal. A government has difficulty
assigning responsibility to a single agency-military, police, or intelligence--to
respond. 38
Ofcourse, this generates confusion over developing a common understanding of
rules of engagement as the DoD vies with international and multilateral organizations, international coalition partners, a host of other federal agencies, state and
local law enforcement, and private business to develop ROE. Lines of authority
will crisscross, and the "operational paradigms of politicians, officials, soldiers,
police officers, and related actors get fuzzy and clash."39 In particular, the military's ROE, which are developed for military operations, may conflict with
other agencies' approaches, which are often based on law enforcement. These
fundamental questions must be addressed before mission-specific legal analysis
. can be thoroughly conducted. The essential law of armed conflict and generalized military rules ofengagement for CNA, however, can be developed as a point
ofdeparture for policy and planning. This will enable commanders to begin a dialogue \vithin the defense establishment and with their counterparts outside
the military, facilitating interagency cooperation and action.

The ROE Process
The SROE has added granularity to what many commanders had realized all
along-that they are ultimately responsible for developing and applying ROE.
This responsibility cannot be abrogated to the StaffJudge Advocate or other directorate. During crisis action planning, the Director of Operations (J3) is key to
generating options and ranking the choices available to the commander. When
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engaged in deliberate planning, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy 0'5) is
the central player. These directorates are closely assisted by the judge advocate,
who serves as a facilitator to ensure that the principles of international and domestic law are honored. 4o Toward this end, subject matter experts are critical to
forming meaningful ROE. Generally, the Director ofIntelligence 0'2) and the
Director of Command, Control, Communications and Computers 0'6) are key
advisors regarding CNA capabilities and limitations.

Toward a Results-Based Model
During the drafting process, a "results-based" approach to ROE should be
given preference over broad grants of authority to engage in CNA. Resultsbased ROE tie CNA into a specific mission type, along "vith the e}.-pected, as
well as the desired, political or military effect. Using an air defense unit as an example, CNA ROE might be written to authorize CNA to disable an air defense
site for a specific period of time in order to accomplish one part ofan overall mission. This could prove e}."tremely useful when the alternative of kinetic attack
might release dangerous forces, physical destruction ofthe site is not required, or
physical destruction might cause excessive collateral damage or adverse political
consequences. CNA, by contrast relies upon a data stream to execute an attack,
such as sending an attacking code to an air defense system computer, causing the
power supply to short out. This is in contrast to using the electromagnetic spectrum, such as an electromagnetic pulse, that relies upon kinetic energy to obtain
a similar result. 41
Many commanders are concerned about the delay required to obtain supplemental ROE approval, especially if the requested rules require NCA approval. 42
Duringjoint and combined exercises in the Western Pacific, scenario events typically overtook requests for supplemental ROE, as superseding events made the
supplemental request irrelevant by unfolding scenario events. The same dynamic
occurs in the real world, and the introduction of computer network attack ROE
can only decelerate the process. One method that might speed this process along
has been to request supplemental rules early in a scenario, delegating authorization
to approve the ROE to a level closer to the commander ultimately charged "vith
its use. For example, a combatant regional CINC might be delegated authority in
advance for actions that would normally require NCA approval. Additionally, the
supplemental ROE might be authorized pending occurrence of a certain set of
events or tripwires. This type of thinking was evident in discussions "vith Australian operators and attorneys during Exercise TANDEM THRUST 99. 43 In the
Australian Defence Forces, this concept is called "dormant ROE," and it may
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prove to be adaptable to CNA ROE. In "donnant ROE," a set of pre-authorized
supplemental or mission-specific rules becomes effective upon some triggering
event or receipt of a specialized code word. This method has the advantage of
commanders being able to see in advance the level at which authorizations will be
given depending upon how a particular mission develops, rather than waiting for
change to occur during the mission. This avoids the commander having to address
ROE that are suddenly inadequate, and ameliorates the need for additional rules in
the midst ofa crisis. It would also let the military personnel involved in the mission
train for a change in ROE with the actual rules that would apply. Personnel familiar with US and Australian ROE will quickly point out that while the American
ROE are permissive in nature and US commanders feel comfortable with broad
grants of authority without the need to have specific grants of authority, the Australian rules are more restrictive. However, in dealing with CNA, US commanders should e},.-pect more restrictions. When a commander is granted authority to
employ CNA, a limited authorization will most likely be the norm. This will be
the case until such time as decision makers become more comfortable with this
new method ofwarfare, and the ROE mature. One way to accomplish this, without actual use in a conflict, is to better integrate CNA into war games and exercises. In the last two years in particular, ROE addressing computer network attack
and defense have begun to enter the exercise lexicon. Unfortunately, war games
and exercises still rarely contain an ROE development phase where supplemental
rules are discussed and developed. The concepts should be gravitating more
quickly from the national or theater levels to the operational and battle group levels. It is even rarer for the CNA procedures and effects to be explained, or the rules
for their employment to be debated in the fleet. The highly classified nature of
CNA serves to exacerbate this problem.

Training and Gaming ROE
Over the last two decades, the rules of engagement have matured considerably. Captain]. Ashley Roach, USN (ret.) recognized the need for greater understanding ofROE and practice prior to conflict when he wrote nearly twenty
years ago:
There is a very real need for greater knowledge ofrules ofengagement on the part
ofstrategy and policy personnel, tacticians and operators, and even by our civilian
leaders. At present these rules are rarely, if ever, exercised and too few planners
and commanders seek contingent approval for additional or relaxed rules. 44

407

Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of Engagement
Since that time, judge advocates and commanders have made great progress
in integrating ROE with operations. Due to the rapid advance in capabilities
and the explosion of computer networks in civil and military infrastructures
throughout the globe, computer network attack has emerged as one of the few
areas that require more immediate attention. Typically, when any type ofCNA
is included in a war game or exercise, a judge advocate is given the task of crafting ROE for their use, usually without operator input or a full understanding of
the mission it is supporting. The problem oflawyer-operator decoupling during
the drafting of ROE is certainly not unique to computer network attack issues.
Nonetheless, the process ofan attorney crafting ROE without the input ofother
staff representatives-the intelligence and operations directorates in particular-may yield rules that do not serve the commander's complete package ofpolitical and military goals. In exercises, CNA events often are handled
"notionally." That is to say the "Blue" or "Red" team will state its intention to
use CNA for an event, applying pre-authorized ROE developed prior to the
game, and they will be informed by the exercise control group that the effort either succeeded or failed. Even when a supplemental ROE request is sent up the
chain-of-command to the NCA, there is usually no discussion of the actual
method to be employed, making the event much more of a showcase assumption than an actual exercise. Moreover, neither the Blue or Red force, or even
the control group, has an understanding of the mechanics of the CNA and how
it will operate, particularly the potential collateral effects-e:l>.l'ected or unexpected. Ideally, there will be a military attorney advising the exercise control
group that can work with the control staff to determine legal effects of CNA.
One part ofthis analysis that might benefit from more attention is whether CNA
affects persons with protected or special status under international law.

J'Train As We Type"
No matter what shape the ROE begin to take, ifwe do not train like we actually anticipate utilizing a CNA tool, commanders may not have confidence in its
use. Moreover, decision makers will lack confidence in their authorization. Incrementally, progress on increased use ofCNA in war games and e:l>.l'eriments is
unfolding, much like early use ofthe concept ofresponding in self-defense based
upon a demonstration of hostile intent. Many might assume this concept has
been around forever-but although it was adopted into early US ROE and expressed as an inherent right under individual and unit self-defense, this did not
guarantee acceptance or use. 45 Discussing the August 19, 1981, shoot-down of
two Libyan Su-22 fighters by US Navy F-14s, Captain Roach observed:
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It is a common misperception that under the peacetime ROE a commander must
"take the first hit" and cannot act in self-defense until the opposing force has
missiles away. That is not the law and is not required by our general peacetime
ROE.46

Interestingly, the tools and technologies for initiating computer network
attack are e>"'Panding at a rapid pace, unsettling the associated ROE and complicating the ability of attorneys and commanders alike to fashion widely accepted principles. On the other hand, through the process of incorporating
CNA into realistic war games and experiments, the familiarity of future decision makers and commanders is increasing. Once CNA is an option available
in time of crisis, deliberate planning during an armed conflict or other military
operation will e>"'Pand the panoply of available tools for use by the commander. This offers flexibility, asymmetric action, and potentially reduced casualties among both friendly forces and opponents alike. In tum, it promises
to favorably mold the political outcome.

Disciplining CNA
The surest way to control the use of CNA is to keep its authorization at the
NCA level. Doing so simplifies the decision making process for the commander
in the field, but it does so at the expense of removing a flexible instrument from
his or her inventory. This approach tends to move away from the traditional
American position on ROE construction that empowers military commanders
,vith all necessary authority to accomplish an assigned mission, so long as the
ROE are not limited by higher authority.47 The goal should be to exercise and
prepare task force and group commanders to engage opposing forces with computer network attack, but to do so according to accepted criteria or rules. Thus,
we need to migrate from an ad hoc approach to ROE for CNA to a more routine crisis action checklist appropriate for its employment. Any such checklist
would have to be frequendy updated to reflect advances in computer technology. Only by standardizing rules for initiating ROE will commanders become
comfortable ,vith exercising independent judgment on how, when, where, and
against whom to employ CNA. This requires judge advocates to convince commanders, and perhaps innovative technical developers, that computer network
attack is properly analyzed within the traditional ROE and LOAC paradigm
,vith which our leadership has grown accustomed. Of course, questions remain-and the dispositive issue of whether a computer network attack constitutes a "use of force" (and if so, what kind of force)-looms large in the
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background. 48 Still, it would be shortsighted to await the resolution of this and
other politico-legal debates before the military begins to think about a legal
model for computer network attack. With that in mind, the existing approach of
rules ofengagement, embedded within the law ofarmed conflict, has several advantages. The construct is familiar within the United States and abroad, and it is
accepted as a global standard for ameliorating the effects ofmilitary operations. It
is also flexible and adaptable, and reflects hundreds of years of developmental
thinking, so it is a solid foundation on which to build. Most importandy, to the
extent that the law ofarmed conflict has been respected and observed in times of
conflict, it has alleviated suffering, limited destruction and spared civilian
casualties.

Law of Armed Conflict
The basic framework for all discussions of the laws of armed conflict center
around the four principles that evolved from customary international law and
subsequendy codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. These principles
are: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and chivalry. They frame all
military activities in armed conflict, and thus must be understood by policy makers and war fighters alike. Military necessity is a cornerstone principle of military
action. A commander may employ only that degree and kind offorce, not otherwise prohibited by the law ofarmed conflict, required for the partial or complete
submission ofthe enemy. A minimum expenditure oftime, life, and physical resources may be applied. 49
As reflected in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, distinction ensures "respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects .... "50 Article 51 protects civilian populations, and
51(4) defines unlawfully indiscriminate attacks as: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c)
those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by Protocol 1. Consequendy, military strikes must distinguish between lawful combatants and civilians. 51 It would be a violation of
LOAC to use civilians or a protected place or property to shield combatants or a
valid military objective. The presence of civilians within or near a legitimate
military target does not make an attack unlawful.
In the fog of modem war, in which a State's entire society becomes vested
in warfare, it is especially difficult to distinguish between lawful and unlawful
targets:
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One related issue is the e:x1:ent that commanders could order preemptive or
responsive attacks against non-state targets. It's not just the military. The Chinese,
for example, put a lot ofemphasis on people's infonnation warfare-encouraging
individuals to use their own technology to annoy and attack others. 52

As we enter the computer warfare age, nations will attempt to further exploit this
difficulty.
Loss oflife and damage to property incidental to attack must not be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.
This concept of proportionality defines "concrete and direct" military advantage as "the advantage anticipated from the specific military operation of which
the attack is a part taken as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the
operation. "53 Collateral damage and incidental injury have historically been the
product of three factors: (1) a lack offull knowledge as to what is being hit; (2)
the inability to surgically craft the amount of force being applied to the target;
and (3) the inability to ensure that the weapon strikes precisely the right point. 54
On the digital batdefield, collateral damage could affect entire sectors of the
economy and society.
Finally, the main tenets of chivalry center around the principles of treachery
and perfidy. The 1977 Additional Protocol I bans " ... acts inviting the confidence ofan adversary to lead him to believe that he is entided to, or is obliged to
accord, protection under the rules ofinternationallaw applicable in armed conflict, \vith intent to betray that confidence.... "55
Perfidy includes: 1) feigning of intent to negotiate or surrender, 2) feigning
incapacitation, 3) feigning civilian, noncombatant status, and 4) feigning protected status by use ofsigns or uniforms of the UN or neutral states. Ruses, however, are not prohibited in an armed conflict. 56 Legitimate ruses include
camouflage, deceptive lighting, decoys, mock operations, simulated forces and
use of enemy codes and passwords. 57 These long-standing principles ofinternationallaw have direct bearing on possible future CNAs that might rely upon
e-mail delivery. One author has advanced the premise that:
While chivalry may seem archaic today, it retains some nonnative value... [by]
analogy [it] strongly weighs against sending a logic bomb disguised as e-mail from
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRe) or even from "Microsoft
Software Support" .... [S]uch a message might be permissible without perfidious
labels. Using ICRC and Microsoft tags would constitute an illegitimate act of
perfidy, much as would disguising any dangerous military intruder in the fonn of
an innocuous invitee.58
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With the principles ofLOAC in mind, a commander must also possess additional information prior to requesting permission for, or directing, a CNA. As a
practical matter, the commander must know the target-is it a network, link, facility or person? He or she must also understand the effect-both military and
cascading or collateral-the CNA will cause.

What is the Target?
Determining the target, and evaluating its lawfulness, will continue to be a focus of rules of engagement, and attacks against information systems are no exception. Whether the target is purely military or civilian, or nominally civilian but
intertwined with military purposes or uses (dual-use) is central to this analysis. In
the computer network attack realm, achieving "Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition" (SCADA) over a target is often the objective. SCADA is the computer control of a power system, railroad or sewer system, or fresh water system.
Over the last twenty years, the US military has relied more on targeting dual-use
infrastructure systems. As this infrastructure becomes modernized and networked
in most nations throughout the world, reaching system SCADA on a variety oflucrative targets is quickly becoming a milestone in any military operation. 59 At least
one proponent has argued that the targeting of electric power distribution and civilian bridges is a violation of Additional Protocol!.60 The Basic Rule of Article
48 states, "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Article 51 (4) states, "Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited."61 Article 51 (2)
states: "The civilian population as such as well as individual civilians shall not be
the object of attacks. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is
to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited. "62

Cascading Effects
Other than the desired military impact, what other probable and possible
effects-cascading effects-can the CNA cause? Once such effects are assessed,
the principle of proportionality must be examined. This would require an
analysis of whether civilian systems will be affected. Is any damage excessive in
light of the definite military advantage anticipated? What is the threshold of allowable civilian damage? Are there alternative means available to accomplish
the mission?
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Getting these answers is the toughest part of the process. Intelligence
might be lacking, collateral effects may not be clearly understood, and the infrastructure being attacked may not be fully comprehended. Uncertainty is
the order. In some ways, a CNA could be considered like a kinetic, indirect
fire weapon. Firing a weapon into an area, even during combat, without
proper intelligence, observation, and identification of valid targets is generally
unlawfu1. 63 In much the same way, launching a CNA without sufficient understanding of the system being attacked would be improper. Add to that the
fact that the weapon itself, in this case a CNA tool, and its effects on a given
target system and other linked collateral systems may be poorly understood.
That is not to say that the CNA tool will not have been reviewed prior to being placed in inventory-for the United States and many other nations, it is a
prerequisite that a weapons review be accomplished prior to it being authorized for use. 64 However, unlike a hand grenade, CNA might have different
effects depending upon the system it is launched against. Additionally, as technology changes, CNA might not have the same effect originally anticipated.
Also of concern, due to the complex nature of computer programming and
principles, is how the commander in the field will ever hope to reach the
same level of understanding as computer and policy experts. Can he rely
upon another's judgment when he is the one "pulling the trigger" by pressing
the keyboard? Will this satisfy his requirements under international law?
What is the minimum level of knowledge the commander must possess?
Must the commander• understand what the targeted system does and how it operates?
• understand how and what CNA will do to the targeted system?
• be in a position, either through intelligence or direct observation, to judge
the effects of the attack?
• determine what other systems share or are linked to the target system and
how those other systems operate and what they control?
• determine what impact the CNA tool will have on the non-targeted
shared or linked system?

Blurring Lines: CNA ROE for Self-Defense
Up to this point we have concentrated mainly on CNA ROE for mission accomplishment. However, a brief discussion of the use of CNA in self-defense is
worthy of examination.
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The 2000 SROE position on actions for self-defense seems to be clear:
"These rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to
use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity."65
It follows, then, that ifCNA has been placed into the available inventory of
weapons, it would be available for actions in self-defense, subject only to authorization by higher authority. Does the novelty of the weapon or the periodic comparison of CNA to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)66 alter the
conditions precedent for the exercise of self-defense, namely necessity and
proportionality?67 If the CNA use conforms to the four LOAC principles,
then characterizing CNA as a WMD is a dubious analogy. Although CNA is,
at least for the present, a novelty, it does not require creation of an entirely
new ROE. The unfamiliarity with CNA, the secrecy with which it is treated,
and, perhaps most importantly, the misperceptions it may cause, could increase provocation and escalation. The SROE already stretches to accommodate these considerations. 68 However, taking CNA off the table for
self-defense may be restricting an otherwise valid option for self-defense. If
specifically tailored, CNA has the potential to remove or counter a hostile act
or hostile intent threat in a "human-friendly" fashion. Unlike a kinetic
weapon, CNA can disable systems without injuring civilians.

Concluding Comment
This chapter focuses on the process of developing rules of engagement for
CNA within the greater context of the international law of armed conflict. It
does not address the general lawfulness ofCNA in international law, except as it
bears on use of force, targeting, and the ROE process. That question is largely
academic, often lying outside the immediate needs of the operational commander and forward-deployed judge advocate. Moreover, much of the analysis
to date, tends toward the theoretical and thus is of greater interest and utility to
scholars than operational commanders.
By offering some practical principles for developing ROE, we hope to begin closing the gulf between theoretical discussions of CNA and its operational application by theater and task force commanders. The ROE process
includes developing the rules within the context of the law, doctrine, and
force structure, as well as the boundaries of the mission. During the developmental process, and throughout the application of CNA across the conflict
spectrum, the commander should be personally involved. ROE drive CNA
and have a dispositive effect on the political and military landscape.
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